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Abstract.
Trusted health care outcomes are patient centric. Requirements to ensure both the quality and sharing of patients’ 
health records are a key for better clinical decision making. In the context of maintaining quality health, the 
sharing of data and information between professionals and patients is paramount. This information sharing is 
a challenge and costly if patients’ trust and institutional accountability are not established. Establishment of 
an Information Accountability Framework (IAF) is one of the approaches in this paper. The concept behind 
the IAF requirements are: transparent responsibilities, relevance of the information being used, and the 
establishment and evidence of accountability that all lead to the desired outcome of a Trusted Health Care 
System. Upon completion of this IAF framework the trust component between the public and professionals 
will be constructed. Preservation of the confidentiality and integrity of patients’ information will lead to trusted 
health care outcomes.
Keywords: information accountability, social networks, electronic health record, medical informatics, patient 
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Introduction 
Health care is an information-intensive business, generating huge volumes of data from hospitals, primary 
care facilities, surgeries, clinics, laboratories and research organisations. Health care related data and health 
informatics comprise both an electronic health record (EHR) and individual electronic health record (IEHR). 
Health information and knowledge are heterogeneous in nature and presently reside in multiple, unstructured 
Health Information Systems (HIS), databases, and reporting systems. Trusted health care outcomes are patient 
centric with self monitoring and maintenance of health information. Such outcomes depend on the quality of 
health and/or medical records that have been cognitively understood, and shared for clinical decision making 
through valid authentication processes. Better patient outcomes also depend on linking those EHRs, HISs and 
sharing the embedded information and knowledge to deliver evidence-based medical practice. Sharing EHR 
and/or IEHR for clinical decision making plays a vital role in achieving better quality outcomes for patient 
care at any point in time. 
If all Australians were to own and control their personal electronic health record by 2012 [1], sharing 
such information would be a challenge. Despite decades of experience in the successful application of 
information technology to other information-intensive industries, Health Care Information Technology 
(HIT) developments continue to have significant challenges due to their present failures, a lack of trust and 
accountability, their vulnerabilities, public perceptions and poor social acceptance. From a health economic 
perspective the cost of implementation is rising, and the business model is poorly defined thus not giving the 
expected results [2]. Consequently, the cost of high quality health care is increasing.
Health Care Information Technology (HIT) 
The successful use of Information Technology (IT) in health care and medicine is a challenging and rewarding 
endeavour. Medical Informatics (in some contexts, this term is used as Health Informatics. In this paper both 
terms will be used interchangeably) is becoming a more familiar term to everyone as IT supports healthcare 
practices and becomes available for different applications in daily life. Information sharing in the global context 
requires the information to be available from different locations around the world. This scenario introduces 
other issues when the information has to be shared within the same or different organisations around the world 
to provide services around the clock. In our view the broad use of the internet and access to medical records 
(eg., EHR) is the way forward. This concept integrates the hardware and software requirement to facilitate 
and enhance the sharing conveniences while preserving security and confidentially of the information that is 
related with health care processes and practices. 
Information sharing: 
Sharing patient information in particular between professional and social groups (public) is a solution we 
propose. However to build end user confidence and trust is challenging. This is a significant challenge because 
end users trust between human to human and human to machine modes for processing health information has 
been lost. Despite this, it is promising that the level of end user trust between machine to machine transfers is 
improving. The limited ability to share information across systems and between care organisations is just one 
of the major impediments in the health care business’s progress toward efficiency and cost-effectiveness [3]. 
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In spite of this scenario, it is the author’s view that it is quite possible to build end user trust for information 
transfer by constructing an information accountability framework between humans through the machine. 
Optimistically, accessing health related real time information to make a decision by the professionals 
and consumers (e.g., Patient) is possible. Pessimistically, it proves vulnerable to have inappropriate, non-
obfuscated data and inaccurate information if the source of information is not screened by experts. This 
will lead to medical errors and negligence where accountability is lost simultaneously. Enhanced use of 
information technology represents an important way to reduce clinical errors [4]. For instance, extending 
HIT to patient’s homes when managing chronic diseases is a significant step forwards [5] and reduces health 
care costs. Furthermore, HIT has undoubtedly reduced the risk of serious injury for patients during hospital 
stays [6]. Balance between such optimistic and pessimistic information management scenarios is a must in 
order to minimise medical errors, improve the quality of decision making in patient care and thereby have the 
healthiest people. 
However, the use of IT also raises a number of serious issues including data interoperability, data security 
and privacy concerns. The privacy concerns are significant in the medical informatics domain and must 
be addressed at the initial stages of the process. The security concerns are critical and must be addressed 
during real time embedding into the Operating System (OS) level [7]. Augmentation of IT to the point-of-
care has produced better and more efficient medical decision making processes and resulted in a variety 
of application developments from the field of medical informatics in recent years. The outlook of medical 
informatics provides a critical understanding of the ways in which IT has reshaped thinking and practices 
regarding organisational solutions and strategies in particular when delivering better and quality health 
care services. It is a worthwhile exercise to explore the ways in which IT has altered the production and 
enhancement of health care knowledge, medical informatics, increased emphasis on ensuring patient safety, 
information accountability [8], information assurance, privacy concerns and prevention of medical error. IT 
has also assisted the development of new protocols such as ubiquitous access (UA) [9], embraced open and 
trusted health information systems (OTHIS) and their services [10], in order to improve health care safety and 
quality. Paramount challenges are to be found in electronic health record sharing, addressing related security 
issues and appeasing confidentiality concerns. 
A major change for the future for information sharing, particularly for the eHealth sector, is the move 
towards distributed solutions. No longer will there be a big central database of eHealth information. This 
has recently been recognised by the Australian National E-Health Transition Authority’s Strategic Plan 
(2009-2012) [24] to “adopt an incremental and distributed approach to development of national Individual 
Electronic Health Records”. This poses additional challenges for the IAF that will require innovative new 
approaches.
Information Accountability 
This argument takes research on health information sharing to another level where accountability for sharing 
electronic medical records is a must. The information accountability means the use of information should 
be transparent so it is possible to determine whether a particular use is appropriate under a given set of 
rules and that the system enables individuals and institutions to be held accountable for misuse [8]. In 
order to establish the information accountability protocols this paper proposes designing; developing and 
delivering an Information Accountability Framework (IAF) that will facilitate sharing the patient information 
from Point-Of-Care to the better patients’ outcomes. Once developed, this proposed IAF will have clinically 
acceptable characteristics and qualities. 
The subsequent sections have been organised to illustrate our approach, scenarios which will take 
place during health care processes, the design and analysis on the information accountability risk and data 
accessibility constraints from technological perspectives. This paper does not delve into details of each and 
every technical development focusing instead on a vision of the IAF.
The approach 
The sustainability of a patient-centric health care system should follow certain governance principles. Such 
principles must implement an authority model that will not be unduly impacted by changes to the political or 
stakeholder environment. Primarily, it is important to understand why patient involvement is becoming a key 
issue when sharing EHR and/or IEHR. It is understood that to improve quality of services by building trust, 
accountability and transparency is paramount. A concept which is tied to accountability is non-repudiation, 
which is a security mechanism by which neither of the parties involved in a communication can deny their 
involvements in a later time. The very basic requirement for non-repudiation is to establish accountability 
of parties involved in a transacting context, such as health-related interactions between the involved parties 
(e.g., doctors, patients, lab technicians, pharmacy personnel, etc). On the other hand it is equally important 
to understand what approaches are available to learn about patient attitudes and needs in the proposed IAF 
Framework. We proposed to capture such user requirements in the IAF design phase (Figure 1) and build 
two different scenarios from the professionals’ (Doctors, Nurses, Radiologists, Pathologists etc) and public 
(patients’) views. The assumptions we made were that the user experiences are semantic profiling while 
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managing and sharing personal information under the users’ control. Consequently, the accountability from 
either party is auditable and discloseable under the said governance principles. 
We propose two scenarios for the trusted patient outcome. The first one is based on utilisation of HER 
and/or IEHR in the professional space (i.e: Medical professionals, specialists, laboratory staff and decision 
makers in the same arena). The second scenario is to empower the public with authorised access to private 
data and information (public view). The interactions between scenario 1 and 2 set the requirements for data 
sharing which must meet the accountability requirements described in Figure 1 and must follow the principles 
of governance alluded to in this paper.
The user requirements are two fold. The first one is the professional space communications between 
professionals. The second fold involves the communication between professionals and patients. Between 
patients an authorised third party interaction is also possible. This authorisation other than professional 
authentication will be categorised as a patients’ interaction hence it will be considered under IAF as a public 
view. Based on such user cases the data flow must be screened using an IAF auditable trail where each 
and every request, authentication and authorisation will be screened, approved, denied, audited, recorded, 
documented and achieved.
IAF Audit Trail and Workflow
The second stage of the IAF involves connecting requests from either the public space to the professional 
space or vice versa. The data and information flow, audit and log trials are presented in Figure 2.
We argue that a solid integration between OS-based security and OS-based sensor node embedded data 
access and retrieval architecture would be an ideal framework for the IAF led patient care systems. Such 
systems should have protocols for information accountability and auditing processes from the data access 
roles as well as for reporting roles. In addition it would be ideal to include an encryption data read and write 
model in order to protect security and privacy of the patient record. Figure 2 depicts a possible architecture 
for the IAF patient care systems. Different layers of information accessibility, information accountability, 
roles, responsibility, logs, auditing and reporting mechanisms respectively are presented in Figure 2. As the 
framework stands for conceptual presentation, each layer is embedded with its architecture to accommodate 
necessary functionalities. In particular, the OS-based security [6] model and Health Information Access 
Control (HIAC) model [10] are in its implementation stages. Details of OS-based security and the HIAC 
model will not be discussed in this paper; however the approaches of such concepts are available via the 
literature [6] and [10].
Figure 1. Information Flow of the Scenarios
Figure 2. Proposed IAF Audit and Log Trail Workflow
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Data Encryption mechanism
The data encryption and database service scenarios are presented in Figure 3 and 4 respectively. The encryption 
mechanism is an effective way to protect the sensitive data in the database from various operations and allow 
the tracking of unauthorised access. Figure 3 demonstrates possible data read and write roles that are designed 
to serve a client/server module. The client modules have extra metadata and encrypt/decrypt modules. 
1. The encrypted database service scenario in Figure 3 involves the following entities and components.
2. The user (human entity) requests the queries to the system
3. The client (front end) transforms the queries posed by user(s) into equivalent queries operating on the 
encrypted data stored on the server
4. The server (Database) stores the encrypted data from one or more data owners and makes them available 
for distribution to clients
5. The Query Processor in the client module transforms the original plaintext query to the transformed query 
according to the cryptographic algorithm used
6. The Query Executor in the server processes the transformed query and returns the encrypted query result 
to clients
Metadata is used to help search data in databases. In the encrypted database system, metadata would be the 
index to help search the result.
Figure 4 conceptually describes the two modules: client (Remote Household) and server (Database Server). 
To explain the scenario briefly, the Query Manager in the client transforms the queries into equivalent queries 
operating on the encrypted data stored in the database according to the cryptographic algorithm defined by 
metadata [12]. The Query Processor in the server transforms the query and returns the encrypted query results 
to the clients. Finally, the Query engine in the client module extracts the encrypted query with the help of the 
metadata. 
The proposed data services scenario further facilitates local encryption database services as illustrated 
in Figure 4. Such options complete authorisation requirements from the public space where there is no 
requirement to complete the server side round trip. This approach will minimise the execution time thereby 
improving the response rate.
Data encryption and the Human adaptation: 
Patients’ concern on their identity and individual health information is understandable. When these 
expectations are not met the society feels violated and the likelihood of co-operation reduces dramatically. 
It is the patient’s privacy everyone is aiming to protect. On the other hand, patient safety is increasingly 
being recognised as a vital issue for health care [17] whilst enhanced use of HIT reduces clinical errors [4]. 
Given such scenarios, new technologies, such as Ubiquitous Health and sensor networks for telecardiology 
purposes give new possibilities for monitoring vital parameters with wearable biomedical sensors. These 
give patients the freedom to be mobile and still be under continuous monitoring and thereby are guaranteed a 
better quality of patient care [11]. Integration of telemedicine with medical micro sensor technology provides 
a promising approach to improve the quality of people’s lives. This type of network can truly implement the 
goal of providing health-care services anytime and anywhere [18]. While use of HIT helps to improve quality 
of life, the user’s behaviour is subject to change, and thereby the proposed IAF application often incorporates 
the user’s behavioural context automatically [19]. Balancing human behaviour within the proposed IAF 
environments is a research challenge. This subject will not be discussed in this paper; however the topic 
remains under the IAF research agenda for future work. 
Figure 3. The Bucket Indexed Encrypted Database Service Scenario 
for the Professional and Public spaces [12]
Figure 4. The Encrypted Database Service Scenario for the 
Public space [16]
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Outcomes
We consider a basic security assessment analysis of the propose IAF, based on Australian standards [20] 
illustrated in Figure 5 and a comparison of encryption schemes tabulated in Table 1.
Likelihood vs Impact (consequences) Analysis
In the real world, health care services must be secured against several impediments. To prevent the service 
from security incidents, we need to identify any threats. A threat causes a detrimental result to the system or 
information properties from an intentional action or an unexpected accident. Threats in information security 
may be segmented into three areas; Human, technical and environmental [20].
Human (accidental and deliberate) threats: This area may include failure due to employees or vandalism 
follows operational procedures e.g. theft, acts of disgruntled employees. These can be prevented by employee 
training, policy, access control, and cryptography.
Technical threats: This area may include power outages, equipment failure or malfunction. These can be 
prevented by employing multiple servers for duplexing systems and locating these away from the main 
service.
Environmental threats: This area may include natural disasters such as flooding, fire and lightning strikes. The 
threats can be prevented by back-up protection.
Once the threats are identified, the influence of risks to the service should be estimated and prioritised by 
severity. For each threat the likelihood and Impact/Consequence needs to be determined in order to evaluate 
the risk. A 12 month period of event occurrences based on the scenario proposed is divided into four event 
occurrences with different probabilities. 
•	 Almost Certain: This event will most likely occur;
•	 Likely: A high chance that this event will occur;
•	 Possible: A chance that this event will occur; 
•	 Unlikely: A minimal chance that this event will occur.
• The influence of the threats is considered to have four possible impacts or consequences:
Critical: The impact will be substantial to the patient or the business, causing a major impact such as loss of 
patient confidence, reputation, embarrassment and income. It could even be threatening life, and an extended 
period of time may be needed to recover: 
High: The impact will be harsh to the patient or the business, and there may be a chance that operations 
discontinue for a period of time so that loss of patient confidence, reputation, embarrassment or income can 
be compensated: 
Medium: The impact will be passable to the patient or business, causing a loss of patient confidence, 
embarrassment or income;
Low: The impact will be nominal to the patient or business. 
We prioritise the risk of an event occurring on the basis of Consequence and Likelihood that we can identify 
for any given scenario. For example, if a risk is considered to be HIGH, it will be prioritised over LOW. The 
basic analysis of the scenario we presented were analysed and presented in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Likelihood Analysis (13) Table 1. Comparison of Encryption Schemes
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In the data sharing scenario it is common to use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) as a security standard for 
various E-services on Internet web browsers, and it provides application layer security with authentication, 
data confidentiality and integrity service. Based on these, remote patients can have access to the Intranet of 
a remote hospital using their own web browsers without installation of dedicated software, whereas IPSEC-
VPN requires remote hardware and software for every household. Therefore, patients with SSL-VPN do not 
need to purchase additional devices for network access and hospitals can save their man-power because they 
will have no devices to maintain. 
Not only is this is a cost effective feature, SSL-VPN can also be quite compatible with the Telehealth or 
Ubiquitous Health environment in which various applications for medical purposes may be implemented. 
Moreover, it enables different access controls depending on locations as patients gain mobility with smart 
phones. For example, when a patient tries to get permission to access a hospital intranet from an untrusted 
network, they will be restricted in case they try to approach some critical information.
In the mechanism we proposed, Data transmission between remote clients and web-based authentication 
servers is secured by the SSL channel. The SSL channel automatically generates and exchanges keys. After 
key exchange, both sender and receiver have a copy of the same key which they will use for symmetric 
encryption. Symmetric encryption techniques will be used for transferring data because they are much faster 
(more than 100 times) than asymmetric or public key schemes. The symmetric block cipher AES-128 is 
chosen both for security and due to its decryption performance at speed. The 128-bit AES perform better than 
the 192-bit and 256-bit version of DES or of AES as below Table 1 [21]. Block cipher can be used in any 
alternative modes. The modes providing authenticated encryption may prove particularly useful for health 
record sharing scenarios [22].
Discussion
We presented an IAF for the trusted patient health care outcomes. The IAF framework comprises auditable 
trails enabling information accountability and transparency when being accessed and used by the public and 
professionals as per the scenario defined.
The proposed IAF Audit and Log Trail Workflow depicted in Figure 2 demonstrates that the tasks are 
achievable based on the embedded encryption technologies. The proposed data services scenario and metadata 
model further facilitate local encryption database services (Figure 3 and 4 respectively) which is a promising 
start.
As presented in Figure 5 the Likelihood versus Impact (consequences) Analysis predicts the high risk 
public certainty which is in an acceptable range. This is practicable when human decisions and perceptions 
are a contributing factor in the process. In a health service and delivery process, the outcomes are dependent 
on trust and acceptance. Information in the health care literature suggests that perhaps a new approach is 
needed to educate the public [23].
Practical issues and challenges remain in the selection of the efficient security encryption algorithms and 
determination of the efficient metadata model for transaction to quantify the completed proposed IAF.
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